Friday, April 10, 2020

People v Alapan

People v Alapan
GR No. 199527, January 10, 2018

Martires, J.:

Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the judgment of conviction.

In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from petitioner Brian Victor Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the said amount within three (3) months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks. When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, PNB informed petitioner that the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account against which the checks were drawn was closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of the checks.
Municipal Trial Court convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment considering that respondent's act of issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time offender. On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna because she did not participate in the issuance of the dishonored checks.
After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The writ, however, was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty for respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.
MTC denied the motion on the ground that subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was not imposed in the judgment of conviction. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It held that respondent could not be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment because the judgment of conviction did not provide for such penalty in case of non-payment of fine. The RTC further opined that the MTC decision which already attained finality could no longer be altered or modified.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
I. WHETHER PETITIONER MAY ASSAIL THE PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT MAY UNDERGO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FINE.

RULING:
I.                              NO.
II.                           NO.

Petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court's order.
In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General.
Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private complainant is limited only to the civil liability arising from the crime.
The penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal aspect of the case. On the other hand, the indemnification for the face value of the dishonored checks refers to the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, petitioner could not appeal the imposition of fine as penalty which was not even questioned by the People through the OSG. "While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be tantamount to giving the private prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law.
Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the judgment of conviction.
Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

The final and executory decision of the MTC can no longer be modified.
The time-honored doctrine of immutability of judgment precludes modification of a final and executory judgment. MTC decision has long attained finality and that none of the exceptions finds application in this case.

Tuesday, March 31, 2020

People v Cariño

People v Cariño
GR No. 232624, July 9, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crimes of Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping
Ruling:
Yes.
The accused-appellants are also
Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt
for the Crime of Simple Carnapping


Carnapping is defined and penalized under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."

Notably, the elements of carnapping are: (i) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (ii) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (iii) the taking is done with intent to gain. Essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle.

Significantly, the taking of the motor vehicle is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. The intent to gain or the animus lucrandi, being an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Notably, " [a]ctual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain." Likewise, the term gain is not limited to a pecuniary benefit, but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent already constitutes gain.

In the case at bar, the prosecution proved the existence of all the elements of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt. The Nissan Sentra, which was owned by Moeller, was stolen by the accused-appellants from the victim's house, and brought to Isabela. To eradicate all traces of its previous ownership, the accused-appellants even changed the vehicle's plate number. However, despite their attempt to conceal their crime, the police discovered that the retrieved vehicle bore the same engine and chassis number as the victim's stolen vehicle.

Likewise, the police found the stolen vehicle in Isabela, no less from the information supplanted by Cariño himself. Certainly, Cariño's knowledge about the vehicle's exact location shows his complicity in its taking. Added to this, Cariño was in possession of the car keys, which he surrendered to the police.
Aggravating Circumstance Not Alleged
in the Information while Proved in the
Course of Trial cannot be Appreciated
It must be noted that the Information charging the accused-appellants with carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as amended, failed to allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence against, or intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were proven at the trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the Information. Hence, pursuant to the strict constitutional mandate that an accused must always be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, the accused-appellants may only be convicted of simple carnapping. 

People v Alapan

People v Alapan GR No. 199527, January 10, 2018 Martires, J.: Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly sta...