People v Alapan

People v Alapan

GR No. 199527, January 10, 2018

Martires, J.:

Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the judgment of conviction.

In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from petitioner Brian Victor Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the said amount within three (3) months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks. When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, PNB informed petitioner that the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account against which the checks were drawn was closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of the checks.

Municipal Trial Court convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment considering that respondent's act of issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time offender. On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna because she did not participate in the issuance of the dishonored checks.

After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The writ, however, was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty for respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.

MTC denied the motion on the ground that subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was not imposed in the judgment of conviction. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court.

The RTC dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It held that respondent could not be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment because the judgment of conviction did not provide for such penalty in case of non-payment of fine. The RTC further opined that the MTC decision which already attained finality could no longer be altered or modified.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

I. WHETHER PETITIONER MAY ASSAIL THE PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT MAY UNDERGO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FINE.

RULING:

I.                              NO.

II.                           NO.

Petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court's order.

In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General.

Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private complainant is limited only to the civil liability arising from the crime.

The penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal aspect of the case. On the other hand, the indemnification for the face value of the dishonored checks refers to the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, petitioner could not appeal the imposition of fine as penalty which was not even questioned by the People through the OSG. "While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be tantamount to giving the private prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law.

Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the judgment of conviction.

Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

The final and executory decision of the MTC can no longer be modified.

The time-honored doctrine of immutability of judgment precludes modification of a final and executory judgment. MTC decision has long attained finality and that none of the exceptions finds application in this case.

Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/jan2018/gr_199527_2018.html

People v Cariño

People v Cariño

GR No. 232624, July 9, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crimes of Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping

Ruling:

Yes.

The accused-appellants are also
Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt
for the Crime of Simple Carnapping

Carnapping is defined and penalized under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."

Notably, the elements of carnapping are: (i) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (ii) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (iii) the taking is done with intent to gain. Essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle.

Significantly, the taking of the motor vehicle is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. The intent to gain or the animus lucrandi, being an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Notably, " [a]ctual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain." Likewise, the term gain is not limited to a pecuniary benefit, but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent already constitutes gain.

In the case at bar, the prosecution proved the existence of all the elements of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt. The Nissan Sentra, which was owned by Moeller, was stolen by the accused-appellants from the victim's house, and brought to Isabela. To eradicate all traces of its previous ownership, the accused-appellants even changed the vehicle's plate number. However, despite their attempt to conceal their crime, the police discovered that the retrieved vehicle bore the same engine and chassis number as the victim's stolen vehicle.

Likewise, the police found the stolen vehicle in Isabela, no less from the information supplanted by Cariño himself. Certainly, Cariño's knowledge about the vehicle's exact location shows his complicity in its taking. Added to this, Cariño was in possession of the car keys, which he surrendered to the police.

Aggravating Circumstance Not Alleged
in the Information while Proved in the
Course of Trial cannot be Appreciated

It must be noted that the Information charging the accused-appellants with carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as amended, failed to allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence against, or intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were proven at the trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the Information. Hence, pursuant to the strict constitutional mandate that an accused must always be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, the accused-appellants may only be convicted of simple carnapping. 

Full Text: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2018julydecisions.php?id=616

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GGG

G.R. No. 224595, September 18, 2019

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 6, Dipolog City, convicting accused-appellant GGG (appellant) of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
The prosecution presented five witnesses: (1) BBB, the mother of AAA; (2) CCC, the brother of AAA; (3) SPO4 Ronnie Quizo, the arresting officer; (4) Dr. Rolito Cataluna; and (5) Dr. Zita Adaza.

CCC, the 14-year-old brother of AAA, testified that on 28 February 2005, a party was held at their house in Dapitan City for the birthday of his brother EEE's daughter. Among those who attended the party was appellant. After dinner, he and his sister AAA slept in one of the bedrooms, which was visible from the sala where EEE and his guests, including appellant were still drinking Tanduay Rhum. The following morning, at 5:00 a.m., CCC was awakened when he felt the floor shake. CCC saw a man on top of AAA having sexual intercourse with her. AAA was gasping for breath and moaning in pain. When CCC switched on the light in the room, he saw appellant, who was only wearing a big t-shirt but no pants, about to leave the room. Appellant asked CCC for some salt and CCC told him to get some in the kitchen. CCC was scared because appellant just raped his sister. In the afternoon, CCC went to Zamboanga to report the rape incident to his mother BBB.

Dr. Cataluna then explained that the medical certificate states that AAA had lacerations in the vaginal canal which may be caused by biking, or an inserted penis, among others. He added that the result of the urinalysis conducted on AAA indicated the presence of spermatozoa in her vagina.

Dr. Zita Adaza testified that on 30 August 2006, she examined AAA and found her: (1) mentally retarded and mute; (2) totally dependent on her mother; (3) has cardiovascular problem; (4) has a very low mental classification; and (5) has a profound level of 5 which is the lowest level.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
Appellant alleged that in the evening of 28 February 2005, he attended the birthday party of EEE's daughter at AAA's house. The party ended at around 10:00 p.m. and he left the party with Eneria, EEE and his friends. At around 12:00 midnight, he slept in the sala of Eneria's house and woke up the following day at 10:00 a.m. Appellant admitted that he went to AAA's house to ask for salt from CCC, but he was there in the evening of 28 February 2005 and not on 1 March 2005. On cross-examination, appellant stated that Eneria's house is very near AAA's house which is only 150 meters away. Appellant admitted that he knew AAA was mute and mentally retarded.

Eneria testified that on 28 February 2005, she and appellant were at the birthday party of EEE's daughter. At around 10:00 p.m., she, her children and appellant left the party and went home to her house to sleep. Eneria testified that appellant slept in her house and that he could not have raped AAA because he stayed in her house the whole night and only left the following day.

ISSUE: Whether appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING
Denial and alibi, which are self-serving negative evidence and easily fabricated, cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of a credible witness. The victim's brother, CCC, who witnessed the rape incident, positively identified appellant as the person who raped his sister AAA. Furthermore, as found by theCA and the trial court, appellant's alibi is weak considering that Eneria's house where appellant slept is only 150 meters away from AAA's house, such that it was not impossible for appellant to go to AAA's house on the date and time of the rape incident.

However, appellant should be convicted of qualified rape pursuant to Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the RPC since the Information alleged, and it was proven, that appellant knew at the time of the commission of the crime that the victim AAA is mentally retarded.[12]

Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the RPC, as amended, provides:

ART. 266-B. Penalties. - x x x

x x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

x x x x

10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

In this case, appellant admitted that he knew that AAA is mute and mentally retarded. Since appellant knew of AAA's mental disability when appellant raped her, the proper designation of the crime committed is qualified rape.

Appeal from Labor Arbiter to NLRC

G.R. No. 195109               February 4, 2015

ANDY D. HALITE, DELFIN M. ANZALDO AND MONALIZA DL. BIHASA, Petitioners,
vs.
SS VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC., SUNG SIK LEE AND EVELYN RAYALA, Respondents.

An appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be perfected within ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter. 

In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon 

(1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; 
(2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and 
(3) filing of a memorandum of appeal.

Compromise Agreement

A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and is immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law.

Gadrinab v. Salamanca

G.R. No. 194569

June 11, 2014

On Bigamy

Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

Lasanas v. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014

Hesitate but never stop there. Else, you fail!

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALIM ISMAEL

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.

SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG, Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017
Del Castillo J

Salim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). 

Elements of Illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.

Elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs

[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs;

[2] such possession was not authorized by law; and

[3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.

The dangerous drug seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. xxx In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.

SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the seized drugs immediately after they were confiscated from appellant. No explanations were given why markings were not immediately made. At this stage in the chain, there was already a significant break such that there can be no assurance against switching, planting, or contamination. The Court has previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt."

Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized item subject of the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the illegal possession case. This is material considering that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the seized drug.

Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence of the appellant. This requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.

The prosecution failed to:

(1) overcome the presumption of innocence which appellant enjoys;

(2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime;

(3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and

(4) offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were not complied with.

The Court is thus constrained to acquit the appellant based on reasonable doubt.


Full Text: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/feb2017/gr_208093_2017.html

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY (CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA

G.R. No. 211724, August 24, 2016

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY (CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN THE RECORDS OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE), FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, Petitioner 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS: For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela." However, when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised to discover that he was registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela."

Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 and is the acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), former governor of the said province, and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased. He averred that while his parents did not marry each other, he has been known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said surname in all of his official and legal documents. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.

In a Decision, CA held that Petitioner’s failure to implead and notify the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings as mandated by the rules precluded the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case, thereby, reversing the RTC’s Decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's birth certificate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,

HELD: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court emphasized that in a petition for a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby be made respondents for the reason that they are indispensable parties.

Similarly, in Republic v. Uy, the Court nullified the trial court's order to correct respondent's entry for the latter's failure to implead and notify not only the Local Civil Registrar, but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections sought.

In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings.  Although he claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless mandate compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and due process and to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the subsequent publication of a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or, (d) when a party is inadvertently left out, these exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in this case.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.

In Republic v. CA, the Court held that the proceedings of the trial court were null and void for lack of jurisdiction as the petitioners therein failed to implead the civil registrar, an indispensable party, in the petition for correction of entry, viz.: 

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not imp leaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.

x x x x

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the corrction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Full Text: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2016/aug2016/gr_211724_2016.html